Even before the war on Ukraine, the idea that economic interdependence would reduce mistrust and facilitate cooperation had been challenged. In light of current events, “selective collaboration” based on common security and economic concerns and shared values might be the most effective – and pragmatic – way forward.

As Russia continues its war of aggression in Ukraine, the news from the battlefield and the horrific images of the human costs of this war continue to dominate the headlines. Looking beyond these headlines, a number of important questions arise. When, for example, will this war end? What will a peace deal entail? And what will a post-war world look like?

At present, it’s impossible to answer these questions with any degree of certainty. At the same time, several longer-term implications of the war are already evident. It’s safe to predict, for example, that so much of what one might call “global collaboration” will change substantially, or even disappear. And to maintain peace and prosperity in this changed world, new forms of collaboration will be necessary.

Independence or Interdependence?

Even before the war, the idea that economic interdependence would reduce mistrust and promote prosperity everywhere had already fallen out of favour in many countries. Growing distrust between the United States and China fuelled a belief that economic interdependence can actually pose a threat to national security, especially in high-tech sectors that will drive global prosperity in the future. COVID uncovered the hidden vulnerabilities of deeply integrated global supply chains in a time of crisis. The unequal outcomes of globalisation led to political polarisation, populism, and a broad backlash against globalisation more generally.

Russia’s aggression has only accelerated these trends. Even if peace comes quickly in Ukraine – a highly unlikely event – Europe will continue to reduce its dependency on Russian fossil fuels. Bans on high-tech exports to Russia will likely remain in place. Western trepidation towards China, exacerbated by its refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion, will only grow. Economic ties will be viewed even more intensely through the prism of national security, and supply chains will come under greater scrutiny. Comparative advantage, a concept which drove so much of global economic policy in recent decades, will be subordinated even more to a view that equates economic security to national security.

How Selective Collaboration Can Succeed

This doesn’t mean that globalisation is dead, since so much of global trade and investment is indeed beneficial for all parties involved and innocuous from a national security perspective. Instead, global collaboration is giving way to more selective collaboration based on common security and economic concerns and shared values. The swiftness with which the democracies of the West responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is one such example of selective collaboration. Another is the U.S./EU Trade and Tech Council, which aims to coordinate Transatlantic approaches to national and economic security challenges. Originally created in 2021 with China in mind, the Council has gained additional relevance as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Looking forward, such collaboration among Western democracies based on shared values, economic interests and national security concerns will likely become even more institutionalised. To be truly effective, however, such selective collaboration should adhere to certain principles.

First of all, it should not forsake the concept of comparative advantage. Whatever problems globalisation may have caused, it lowered production costs dramatically, and re-prioritising economic and national security will raise costs again. As the West defines common boundaries around high tech trade or strengthens supply chain resilience, for example, it should also deepen economic integration to capture the advantages of globalisation while minimising its negative consequences. This includes having the political courage to pursue high-standard understandings to liberalise trade and investment between like-minded countries while protecting labour rights and accelerating the transition to a carbon-neutral economy.

Secondly, selective collaboration should be inclusive. Governments should view their private sector as partners, and not as part of the problem, in their efforts to promote economic and national security. Efforts to deepen economic integration among the West should be open to other countries willing to commit to high standards. This is especially true for countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, even if their views on Russia do not perfectly align with those of the West. Excluding them from the opportunities of a more closely integrated West only makes China or Russia a more attractive partner over the longer term. The West should also not principally exclude China if it is truly prepared to accept the high standards any common arrangements, or a different Russia in a post-war scenario.

Finally, selective collaboration should promote cross-generational dialogue and people-to-people ties, as that fosters understanding for different points of view and will help bridge the invariable diversity of interests that can stand in the way of deeper overall collaboration. Collaboration must also protect the open and free flow of information that is the lifeblood of democracy. Governments must collaborate to strengthen the institutions protecting freedom of speech, and everyone working in communications – be it corporations, consultancies or the media – has the responsibility to communicate fact based, evaluate sources carefully and support the free flow of correct information.

About the Author:

As a Consulting Partner in the Berlin office of Finsbury Glover Hering’s Government Affairs, Policy & Advocacy Division, William “Bill” Klein brings over three decades of experience leading diverse multinational teams in both the public and private sectors. He helps international corporates and investors assess geopolitical uncertainties and complexities and advises them on how to navigate political and regulatory environments at the national and global level.

Prior to joining the firm, he spent a total of over 20 years in the diplomatic service of the United States, representing its diplomatic, economic and security interests in China, Taiwan, Ukraine, Israel, India, Qatar and Washington, DC. Earlier, he built and led profitable capital markets teams for German banks in Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig. He is also a non-resident senior associate at the Freeman Chair in China Studies of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.